https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/house/sitting-320/hansard#12770642 Honourable Michael Chong (Wellington—Halton Hills, CPC): “The bill would create a new offence of up to life in prison for a person who commits any indictable offence under the Criminal Code or under any other act of Parliament at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity.”

https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/house/sitting-320/hansard#12771238 Mr. René Villemure (Trois-Rivières, BQ): “Bill C-70 will also eliminate the requirement to prove that a criminal act benefited a foreign state or harmed Canada.”

“Bill C-70 also provides for consecutive sentences and even life imprisonment for certain offences. I understand the desire to impose harsher sentences, but listen to what the Canadian Civil Liberties Association had to say. It said, and I quote:
The availability of life imprisonment for certain offences introduced under Bill C-70 is disproportionate and excessive. For example, a person convicted of an indictable offence under the Criminal Code, even as minimal as theft under $5,000, could be sentenced to life in prison if they acted for the benefit of a foreign entity.”

https://sencanada.ca/en/content/sen/chamber/441/debates/213db_2024-06-17-e#53 Honourable Yuen Pau Woo: “I hoped at the time that we could have a grown-up conversation about foreign interference so that we can avoid the excesses that I think we’re beginning to enter into. I failed because today we are in a fevered environment where there is, it would seem, overwhelming support — indeed, unanimous approval — for a bill on countering foreign interference that has manifest flaws in it that have been raised to all of us through a variety of sources in civil society, academia and from ordinary Canadians.”

“Let me now get to a number of the flaws that I see in the bill that I hope others will pick up and that we can perhaps put some thought into ameliorating. These are only a few examples.”

“The first has to do with the Security of Information Act where there’s a new offence related to political interference. I agree with the need to stop political interference from foreign principals, but there’s a special provision where there is an offence of preparing the act of political interference. It says that this offence is when someone does anything that is directed towards or done in preparation of the commission of the offence, “the offence” being political interference.”

“In this provision, we are copying from the Australian example, where they also have a provision against the preparation and planning of an act of foreign interference, and they had their first conviction last year. Let me tell you that story.”

“A Vietnamese Australian has been sentenced to two years in jail for the act of preparing or planning an act of foreign interference. What was that act? He organized a fundraiser during COVID, raising money from Vietnamese and Indo-Chinese-Australian communities to buy personal protective equipment and other medical supplies, and he donated that money to a hospital. At the ceremony where the donation was made, he invited a politician — I think he was a sitting minister at the time — to stand with him on the stage holding one of these fake cheques for $25,000 Australian. That was used as evidence that this Vietnamese Australian person was cultivating the minister for a future act of foreign interference.”

“Just think about that. The Australian system is the Australian system, and they have the right to conduct themselves in the way that they want to. But are we going down the road where someone who develops a relationship with a politician or a public official who may have the potential to rise up the ladder sometime in the near or distant future, that that act in itself is a crime of planning or preparing an act of foreign interference? It drives shivers down the spine.”

“I also like this registry in that it doesn’t use the concept of related entity, which is such a broad and vague term that it can capture just about anyone who is associated with an organization that is in some way connected to a foreign power. Instead, it uses the term “arrangements.” I recommended the idea of using the word “arrangements,” but I would have preferred that it focus on material arrangements because that’s concrete — a contract, a quid pro quo, a trip to Taiwan, for example, to Israel, to China or to Mexico. That’s a material arrangement. Instead, what we have is “. . . arrangements . . .” or “. . . in association with . . .” Here, I have grave concerns. What does “. . . in association with . . .” mean?”

“The best clue is found in the consultation paper that was issued by Public Safety in preparation for this bill, which gave us a case study of what I think they mean. Here is the case study.”

“An academic has a meeting with a foreign principal. It could be a diplomat; it is somebody who represents another government. They have a conversation or maybe multiple conversations. Shortly after, the academic writes an op-ed that is in favour of that country’s position on a given issue. Maybe the academic also gives some lectures on campus in favour of or aligned — shall we say — with that government’s position. That example is described in the consultation paper as an act of malign foreign interference, and it is my interpretation that the intent of this bill and the use of the term “. . . in association with . . .” would capture the acts of that academic. But, colleagues, if an academic has a meeting with a foreign official and that academic later expresses a view which is closely aligned with the foreign government…”

“How do we know that the academic did not share the view in the first place?”

“Let me give you an example of why this is so problematic. An issue that will come before us very soon is the question of whether we should impose tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, or EVs. Some of you know that the Americans have imposed a 100% tariff on Chinese EVs. The Europeans have imposed a tariff on them as well, though at a lower level. There is already a debate in this country as to whether we should follow suit. The automotive manufacturers and other lobbying groups are in conversation with American interests, including state interests, to suggest that we should impose a similar tariff for a good reason: to protect our industry.”

“At the same time, there are voices in this country saying we should not impose a 100% tariff on Chinese EVs because it is against our interests in the fight against climate change. I won’t get into which side is correct here, but do you think that someone arguing in favour of a 100% tariff under the influence of, say, an American state-linked entity would get the same treatment as someone arguing against a 100% tariff who may have had a connection with a Chinese or Asian entity? I’m suspicious. I don’t know. This is the kind of question we should be asking.”

“There is so much more to talk about, but let me say that foreign interference is a serious issue. We should not stand for foreign interference. I understand the febrile nature of this debate and that no one wants to be seen as being on the wrong side of it. However, a bad bill will not help us in our fight against foreign interference, especially if it is cast so widely that fundamental rights are threatened and it leads to the stigmatization of individuals and groups who are seen as holding the wrong views.”

“We have not given this bill the scrutiny it deserves, and I fear we will come to regret rushing it through our chamber.”

https://sencanada.ca/Content/Sen/Committee/441/SECD/briefs/SECD_SM-C-70_Brief_ICLMG_e.pdf “Proposed s. 20.4 - Influencing political or governmental process – should be revisited to include more specific definitions and introduce safeguards against infringing on participation in the democratic process.”

“This section is particularly problematic, given the ease with which unsupported or baseless accusations are made that protest movements, that seek to influence public policy, are influenced or acting at the behest of foreign actors.”

https://sencanada.ca/Content/Sen/Committee/441/SECD/briefs/2024-06-10_SECD_SM-C-70_Brief_CCLA_e.pdf “Part 4 of the bill, which purports to create a foreign influence Registry, includes vague and broad language that contravenes the principle of democratic accountability. This language also raises concerns about the potential use of the Registry as a tool that could allow the government to monitor not only foreign influence specifically, but also, more generally, the international engagement of various actors, including foreign state-owned or funded media, academic institutions and charities, as well as international organizations such as the United Nations. These considerations potentially involve freedom of the press and privacy issues, as well as questions as to the place reserved for international organizations in Canada’s ecosystem.”

“For instance, it is possible that an individual who has been in contact with a foreign state-owned media or academic institution and who has then engaged with the public with respect to a Canadian political process would be required to provide detailed information to the Registry as to the individual’s activities.”

“Bill C-70’s definition of “arrangement” is also broad and notably includes an arrangement under which a person undertakes, “in association with” a foreign principal, to communicate by any means information related to a political or governmental process.”

“The term “in association with” is not defined, and the comprehensive list of arrangements that will fall outside of the Registry’s scope is again left to future regulation.”

“This vague language, which does not require a subordinate relationship between the foreign principal and the person, could possibly capture individuals engaging with the public while being or after having been in contact with foreign state-owned or funded broadcasters, charities, organizations, or academic institutions, in addition to international organizations such as the United Nations.”

"the proposed sabotage (essential infrastructure) offence carries a significant risk of deterring and suppressing peaceful protest. For context, the proposed new offence does not contain language around foreign interference as an element of the offence, and is therefore applicable in wholly domestic matters. Among our concerns are that,

• what constitutes a “a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or any segment of the public” under s. 52.1(1)(c) is undefined, and could therefore capture conduct that does not pose a direct or imminent risk of bodily harm, e.g. it may be argued that a protest that disrupts major vehicular intersections in a city poses a serious risk because it interferes with police or ambulance response times;"

We will examine just one small portion of the final version of the bill to explore some of the corresponding issues.

https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/bill/C-70/royal-assent “Part 2 amends the Security of Information Act to, among other things, create the following offences:
(a) committing an indictable offence at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with a foreign entity;”

https://sencanada.ca/Content/Sen/Committee/441/SECD/briefs/2024-06-10_SECD_SM-C-70_Brief_CCLA_e.pdf The Canadian Civil Liberties Association (“CCLA”) “is concerned about the scope of this provision and its exceptional penal consequences.
This offence results in life imprisonment – a potential sentence for criminal offences that are otherwise punishable by far lower sentences. For example, a person convicted of mischief in relation to property for the benefit of a foreign entity faces up to life imprisonment, instead of a maximum sentence of two years less a day. While foreign interference is a legitimate policy concern, it should not oust reasonable sentencing ranges for criminal offences which fall toward the lesser end of the spectrum.”

https://sencanada.ca/Content/Sen/Committee/441/SECD/briefs/SECD_SM_C-70_Brief_CBACJS_e.pdf The Canadian Bar Association: “The CBA Section is concerned with the potentially overbroad and vague nature of the new criminal offences created in Bill C-70. We believe there is nothing inherently criminal about a foreign entity defined in s. 2 of the Bill. Sections 20, 20.1, 20.2, and 20.3 either create or amend offences done “at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with” a foreign entity (s. 20.4 does not contain the “for the benefit of language”).”

“This language is only found in the Criminal Code about terrorist and criminal organizations, both of which are by their very definition, criminal entities with which no one should knowingly be involved. The use of that language in those settings is hence a very clear and deliberate warning of what constitutes a crime. In contrast, there is nothing inherently criminal about a foreign entity. Foreign entities can be states, opposition parties, or other groups that meet the definition under the Bill.”

“Therefore, to apply the phrase “at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with”, traditionally used for clear criminal entities, to entities that are not inherently criminal gives rise to a concern that the Bill has an overly broad ambit of the law. We have a further concern about vagueness since determining whether a group constitutes a foreign entity is a retroactive exercise based on a definition that covers many completely lawful entities. This is particularly worrisome given the potential life sentences that attach to these offences and the statutory bar against multiple sentences running concurrently.”

The wording “for the benefit of” does not require an affiliation. It may be as simple as a Canadian happening to have the same thought as a foreign entity.

https://sencanada.ca/Content/Sen/Committee/441/SECD/briefs/SECD_SM-C-70_Brief_ICLMG_e.pdf “Bill C-70 also changes the Security of Information Act, including a new indictable offense for the carrying out of any indictable offense - including relatively minor transgressions - if done for the benefit of a foreign entity. This, along with other new or modified offenses, would be punishable by either life in prison, or consecutive sentences that could amount to life in prison, provisions that are normally reserved for the worst forms of crimes and raise concerns of proportionality in sentencing.”

You may wish to read the bill in its entirety because there are clauses in there which demonstrate that social media will be monitored and which show that use of intimidation (which does not appear to be clearly defined) or a threat can send you to jail for life.

The repeatedly stated reason for rushing was because it was expected to take at least a year, until June 2025, or later, to implement a registry and make other changes happen in time for an October 2025 election. I have been unable to find any evidence of any other reasons given for the need to rush the process. This reason is no longer going to apply if an election happens in March 2025. Some people might say that even if an election were to occur in October 2025, this reason for rushing is insufficient to overcome the negative impacts of Bill C-70.

https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/house/sitting-320/hansard#12771238 Mr. René Villemure (Trois-Rivières, BQ): “I repeat, the Bloc Québécois will support Bill C-70 in principle, but not at the cost of civil liberties. This is an absolutely fundamental issue that demands the utmost vigilance on the part of legislators. We are in favour of passing the bill quickly at second reading, but we would be remiss if we did not conduct a serious study in committee. This must not be rushed through.”

https://sencanada.ca/en/content/sen/chamber/441/debates/213db_2024-06-17-e#53 Honourable Salma Ataullahjan: “Senator Dean, thank you for your speech on Bill C-70. I’ve heard from stakeholders who are concerned that we may be rushing to make changes to our national security legislation which could ultimately impact Canadian civil liberties. I am concerned by the use of the term “intimidation” in clause 53. It lacks a clear definition, and yet it could lead to a person’s life imprisonment. Would you consider either removing the term “intimidation” from clause 53 or, alternatively, amending clause 53 to include a specific definition of “intimidation”?”

There does not appear to have been sufficient time to address this “intimidation meaning” concern in the final wording of the bill.

Honourable Yuen Pau Woo: “Barely two hours ago, 20 of our colleagues were at 1 Wellington to receive a technical briefing on Bill C-70. That’s less than a quarter of our complement of senators. I’m now standing before you, rushed to make a speech after receiving this briefing on short notice, with inadequate preparation, but, nevertheless, I would like to put some things on the record.”

“The first thing, which should be obvious from my preamble, is that we are rushing this bill. There is no question that we are pushing this through with a kind of haste that is not becoming of the upper chamber. I think it is correct to say that at the technical briefing there were many questions that were not asked because of a lack of time, and there were many answers given that were, to some of us, unsatisfactory.”

“Colleagues, the purpose of second reading, typically, is to talk about the principle of the bill. Let me say, first off, that I support the principle of the bill, but the idea of discussing the principle is in anticipation of the bill being sent to a committee where the details of the bill can be studied carefully and possible flaws in that bill can be scrutinized and possibly fixed. What we have instead, as you all know, is a pre-study that took place last week, also rushed, and when the National Security and Defence Committee meets tomorrow — starting 8 a.m., by the way, for those of you who are interested — it will go directly into clause-by-clause consideration. We are essentially skipping — leapfrogging — from second reading to clause by clause, and then, presumably, a third reading vote by Thursday.”

“Colleagues, we are taking less time to review this consequential bill than we did with anti-terrorism bills in the last three decades — in 2001, 2012, 2015 and 2019 — all of which were passed quickly enough in the heat of the moment and were flawed. Some of them had to be fixed a few years later.”

“You may remember, for example, the 2019 amendments to what was previously Bill C-51, the anti-terrorism bill.”

“The likelihood of Bill C-70 is that it will go through to a third reading vote and pass before we rise for the summer — flaws and all. And perhaps we will have a chance down the years to fix some of those flaws, but in the meantime, the price to be paid by the flaws in the bill will be the individuals and organizations who will be trapped or caught by what I think is an overly wide and overly sticky spider’s web that is Bill C-70.”

https://sencanada.ca/Content/Sen/Committee/441/SECD/briefs/SECD_SM-C-70_Brief_ICLMG_e.pdf “This expedited study means that experts and organizations with limited resources have had to rush their analysis of the bill, and has made submitting briefs and appropriate amendments nearly impossible. While we are please to be submitting this brief, and stand behind our concerns, much of what we are recommend are preliminary suggestions that would have benefited from great time for discussion and elaboration.”

“Rushing the parliamentary process, supported by a state of suspicion and ardent calls to protect national security, can lead to serious, negative and long-lasting consequences. An expedited study also risks missing ways the bill could be improved to better address issues of foreign interference.”

https://sencanada.ca/Content/Sen/Committee/441/SECD/briefs/2024-06-10_SECD_SM-C-70_Brief_CCLA_e.pdf The Canadian Civil Liberties Association “wishes to highlight to the Members of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs (“Senate Committee”) its deep concerns about the way the study of Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference, is currently taking place. This bill, which is almost 100 pages long, went through its second reading in the span of one day, on May 29, 2024. The very next day, the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (“House Committee”) began studying it and convoking witnesses, with a deadline for hearing witnesses set to 5 business days later: June 6, 2024.”

“Despite the calls from several civil society organizations, including the CCLA, to slow down the legislative study’s pace so meaningful public consultations may take place, the House Committee is set to begin its clause-by-clause review of Bill C-70 on June 10, 2024. On the same day, the Senate Committee will simultaneously undertake its pre-study of the same bill.”

We are not in a situation of “Bill C-70 versus nothing.” According to the Honourable Senator Dean, who introduced the legislation to the Senate, there was already comprehensive legislation in place as of the year 2019 for detecting foreign influence and for reporting this information confidentially to the government. Foreign influence was detected using existing legislation and it was reported to the government confidentially in the last election, leaving it up to the government on how to act on the matter.

https://sencanada.ca/en/content/sen/chamber/441/debates/213db_2024-06-17-e#53 Honourable Tony Dean: “In 2019, before a general election, the government announced the plan to protect Canada’s democracy. Measures introduced as part of the plan included the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force, the Digital Citizen Initiative, the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, and the Canada Declaration on Electoral Integrity Online. These measures were in place for the 2019 election with the intention of countering any foreign interference attempts.”

Hon. Mr. Charlie Angus charlie.angus@parl.gc.ca

Hon. M. Alexandre Boulerice Alexandre.Boulerice@parl.gc.ca