Archive: https://archive.is/2025.03.24-083459/https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/europes-war-ukraine%23

The fundamental question underpinning Europe’s ability to shoulder the burden of its security—beyond the extent to which this effort is actively obstructed by U.S. policy—is will. Funding existing European commitments to NATO would have brought spending above three percent of GDP for most members. Achieving a rapid expansion of defense industrial capability to sustain Ukraine in addition to regenerating military forces would see the cost grow even higher. So far, European states have been reluctant to commit resources. Germany has just announced an increase in defense spending, while the EU more broadly has shifted its debt rules to allow more borrowing for investment in defense. But as with German announcements in 2022, it is not yet clear that these statements will drive an effective process of rearmament. It is up to the Europeans to determine whether they can stomach the cost, but they should not hide behind the claim that they cannot defend Ukraine without the United States. Much depends, however, on whether the United States wants that transition to take place.